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Abstract: 
 
Are smarter people funnier? Recent work suggests that cognitive abilities are important to humor 
production—the ability to generate funny ideas on the spot. Using the Cattell–Horn–Carroll 
model of intelligence, the present research examined both general and specific contributions of 
cognitive factors to humor ability. It extended past research by (a) measuring a broader range of 
cognitive abilities, including some that have not been assessed thus far, (b) assessing humor with 
a broader battery of tasks, and (c) using bifactor models to estimate both general and specific 
effects of intelligence on humor. A sample of 270 young adults completed measures of fluid 
reasoning (Gf), vocabulary knowledge (Gc), and broad retrieval ability (Gr) along with a battery 
of humor production tasks. All 3 specific factors correlated with humor ability, and a higher 
order model found a large effect of g on humor ability (β = .51 [.32, .70]). In a bifactor model, 
however, humor ability was predicted primarily by g and Gr but not Gf, suggesting that fluid 
intelligence’s correlation with humor ability found in past studies is carried by g. These findings 
illustrate both general and specific effects of intelligence on humor, and they expand the growing 
literature on the important role of intelligence in creative thought. 
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Article: 
 
Humor plays an important role in everyday life, from interacting with strangers to attracting 
mates (Bressler & Balshine, 2006; Earleywine, 2010; Tornquist & Chiappe, 2015). Some people, 
however, come up with funny and witty ideas much more easily than others. Humor production 
ability—the ability to generate funny ideas—varies substantially between people, but the sources 
of individual differences in humor production remain obscure, given the relatively few studies on 
the cognitive psychology of humor. 
 
In the present research, we examine the role of cognitive abilities in humor production, a topic 
with a long past (e.g., Feingold & Mazzella, 1991; Galloway, 1994) that has recently attracted 
more attention (Greengross & Miller, 2011; Kellner & Benedek, 2016). To date, past work has 
primarily focused on only one or two cognitive abilities, usually vocabulary knowledge and fluid 
reasoning, as well as on only one kind of humor task (i.e., writing captions for cartoons). Using 
the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) model as a framework, we examined a broader range of specific 
abilities as well as the contribution of general intelligence, estimated via both higher order 
models and bifactor models. Taken together, the findings clarify the roles of specific and general 
factors of intelligence and suggest a substantial role for intelligence in humor production. 
 
Funny Ideas 
 
Humor production ability is measured with open-ended tasks (Earleywine, 2010). Participants 
receive a visual or verbal prompt that sets up an opportunity for humor, they generate a response, 
and a group of judges then subjectively rates the responses for funniness. By far, the most 
common humor production task involves asking participants to write captions for single-panel 
cartoons—virtually every study has used some form of this task (for a review, see Nusbaum & 
Silvia, in press). Recent years, however, have seen the development of many new tasks, such as 
asking people to write funny fictional resumes (Howrigan & MacDonald, 2008), sarcastic 
responses to hypothetical questions (Howrigan & MacDonald, 2008), witty endings to social 
scenarios (Nusbaum, Silvia, & Beaty, in press), and funny definitions for random noun-noun 
combinations (e.g., definitions for yoga bank, cereal bus, or balloon bench; Nusbaum et al., in 
press). 
 
Researchers have correlated scores on humor tasks with a wide range of constructs, from 
personality traits to demographic factors (Nusbaum & Silvia, in press), but recently they have 
become interested in how cognitive abilities affect how people generate funny ideas. Models of 
humor (Attardo, 1994; Raskin, 1985) suggest several reasons why intelligence should be 
important to variability in humor ability. First, verbal humor draws upon crystallized knowledge 
of the world as expressed through language. Witty material harnesses nuances in words (Aarons, 
2012), such as quirky synonyms (e.g., instead of fighting, two people might be scuffling, 
brawling, rasslin’, or engaged in a bout of fisticuffs), word phonology (Q: What do you call a 
cross between an elephant and a rhinoceros? A: Hell-if-I-know), and polysemy (e.g., outside in 
Groucho Marx’s quip Outside of a dog, books are a man’s best friend; inside of a dog, it’s too 
dark to read). 
 
Second, creating humor often requires accessing and manipulating conceptual material that is 
distant or incompatible, from simple one-liner jokes beloved by little kids (e.g., Q: What’s brown 
and sticky? A: A stick) to jokes that set up and contrast competing situation models (e.g., My 
grandfather died peacefully in his sleep, but the kids on his bus were freaking out) to rich and 
elaborate metaphors (e.g., Barnett Cocks’s view that “A committee is a cul-de-sac down which 
ideas are lured and then quietly strangled”). Theories of humor point out that even simple jokes 
require accessing, maintaining, and integrating incompatible scripts, frames, or mental 
workspaces (Attardo, 1994; Goatly, 2012). 
 
As a result, one would expect several factors of intelligence to be important for producing 
humor. Viewed within a CHC framework (Carroll, 1993; McGrew, 2005, 2009), the two factors 
that have attracted the most attention are crystallized intelligence (Gc) and fluid intelligence 
(Gf). Gc’s relevance to verbal humor production seems obvious, and many studies show at least 
medium-sized effects for Gc. Measures of vocabulary knowledge, for example, correlate with the 
rated funniness of cartoon captions (r = .38 in Greengross & Miller, 2011; r = .37 in Kellner & 
Benedek, 2016), and professional comedians have significantly higher vocabulary scores than 
university students (Greengross, Martin, & Miller, 2012). Likewise, given the executive control 
aspects of humor (e.g., maintaining competing representations), one would expect a role for Gf. 
Two studies found that scores on the Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices predicted the 
funniness of cartoon captions (r = .25; Greengross & Miller, 2011) and a composite humor score 
derived from several tasks (r = .29; Howrigan & MacDonald, 2008), although another study 
found a smaller effect size using tasks from the Cattell Culture Fair tests (e.g., Kellner & 
Benedek, 2016; r = .13). 
 
Given the evidence thus far, a CHC approach highlights two open questions. First, the role of g 
in humor production remains unclear. Two studies have estimated the effect of g, either by 
modeling g as a higher order factor indicated by Ravens and vocabulary tasks (Greengross & 
Miller, 2011) or by using a global WISC–R score (Masten, 1986). Both studies found large 
effects of g on humor production—r = .50 (Masten, 1986) and latent rs = .67 and .51 for men 
and women, respectively (Greengross & Miller, 2011)—but the relative contributions of g and 
the lower-order Gf and Gc factors are unknown. Bifactor models (Little, 2013; Reise, 2012) can 
estimate both specific and general factors, and they are commonly used to separate the 
contributions of lower-order abilities and g (e.g., Gustafsson, 2001; Kvist & Gustafsson, 
2008; Silvia, Thomas, Nusbaum, Beaty, & Hodges, 2016). 
 
Second, a CHC approach would suggest that broad retrieval ability (Gr) is probably at least as 
important as Gf and Gc in humor production ability. In other domains of verbal creativity, verbal 
fluency tasks consistently emerge as important predictors (Avitia & Kaufman, 2014). For 
divergent thinking, the higher order Gr factor is an important predictor of the rated creativity of 
unusual uses (Benedek, Könen, & Neubauer, 2012; Silvia, Beaty, & Nusbaum, 2013). In a CHC 
study of how people generate creative metaphors (Beaty & Silvia, 2013), Gr predicted the rated 
creativity of metaphors (β = .52) beyond the effects of Gf (β = .45) and Gc (β = .24). Gr has yet 
to be examined in humor research, but it captures processes that are likely important. Much like 
divergent thinking and metaphor, humor involves constructing ad hoc categories and searching 
for material that meets constraints (e.g., synonyms for fighting). The ability to generate retrieval 
cues and strategies, to create and identify semantic categories, and to switch between strategies 
and categories despite interference is central to Gr (Rosen & Engle, 1997; Troyer, Moscovitch, 
& Winocur, 1997; Unsworth, Spillers, & Brewer, 2011). 
 
The Present Research 
 
Using a CHC approach, the present study evaluated how an expanded range of cognitive abilities 
predicts humor ability. As in past work, we assessed Gf and Gc, but we included Gr to evaluate 
whether it additionally predicts humor production ability. Furthermore, we expanded on past 
work by using a much larger number of tasks that would afford bifactor modeling of both the 
specific factors and g, and the effects of g were estimated using both higher order and bifactor 
models. Finally, a broader set of humor tasks, many of them newly developed (Nusbaum et al., 
in press), was included. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Our sample was 270 adults enrolled in psychology courses at the University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro (UNCG). They were primarily young (M = 19.08 years, SD = 3.14, range = 18 to 
48), and everyone indicated speaking English as a native language. The sample had an unusually 
high proportion of women (86%), consistent with our university’s history as a former women’s 
college. Because the sample had relatively few men, gender differences were not evaluated 
statistically. 
 
Measures 
 
Humor ability. To assess humor production ability, participants completed three different 
humor tasks. All three tasks have been used in our recent work (Nusbaum et al., in press). 
Participants were told that the study was interested in humor and how people come up with 
funny ideas. Just as creativity research instructs people to “be creative” (Nusbaum, Silvia, & 
Beaty, 2014), humor research instructs people to “be funny.” Specifically, for all tasks the 
participants were told that they should “write something funny” and that what they write “can be 
weird, silly, gross, bizarre, ironic, dirty-minded, or whatever, so long as it’s funny.” 
 
The cartoon captions task asked participants to write a funny caption for three single-panel 
cartoons taken from the New Yorker. Writing captions for cartoons is by far the most common 
humor production task (for reviews, see Nusbaum, 2015; Nusbaum & Silvia, in press), and most 
studies use only cartoon captions to assess humor. The cartoons depicted an astronaut on the 
moon speaking into a cell phone; a king reclined on a couch speaking to a bearded 
psychotherapist; and two office workers, one holding a smoking gun, talking next to a dead 
body. 
 
The joke stems task provided participants with a humorous set-up that they were asked to finish 
with something funny. The set-ups were quirky interpersonal situations that are fertile for humor. 
They resemble the “How _____ was it?” genre of jokes, in which a comedian baits the audience 
(e.g., “My friend’s singing was terrible”), the audience sets the comedian up (“How terrible was 
it?”), and the comedian delivers a punchline (e.g., “Her singing was so terrible, my cat threw a 
shoe at her”). For example, one of scenarios read, “Imagine that your friend invites you over and 
cooks dinner—and the food is totally horrible and disgusting. Later, when describing it to 
someone else, you say, ‘Wow, that food was so bad . . .’” People were told to complete the 
phrase “‘Wow, that food was so bad . . .’” with something potentially funny (e.g., a starving 
child wouldn’t eat it, it was like chewing on sweaty feet, my vagina hurt). The other two 
scenarios involved describing their most boring college class to a friend and describing what it 
was like listening to a friend’s terrible singing. People could complete the joke stem with any 
response so long as the participant thought it was funny. 
 
Finally, the definitions task asked people to write funny definitions for odd concepts. Inspired by 
research on the creative affordances of conceptual combinations (Benczes, 2006; Wisniewski, 
1997), this task presents people with unusual noun-noun combinations that afford funny 
meanings. People were asked to generate a funny definition for three concepts: snuggle war, 
cereal bus, and yoga bank. The humor tasks had no time limit. 
 
Three judges (2 men and 1 woman) rated all the responses using a 5-point scale (1 = Not at all 
funny, 5 = Extremely funny). The judges made their ratings independently, and they were 
unaware of the participants’ responses to the other humor items as well as their responses to any 
other task or scale. Based on Primi (2014), we used many-facet Rasch models (Eckes, 2011) to 
estimate each person’s humor score for each task type. Because each task type had three items 
(e.g., three cartoons) and all responses had three raters, the assessment structure is faceted. Just 
as a Rasch model seeks to estimate a person’s trait score that is adjusted in light of the difficulty 
of the items he or she took, a many-facet Rasch model estimates a trait score (here, humor 
ability) adjusted for (1) the “difficulty” of a task’s items (i.e., it could be easier to come up with 
something funny for some items), and (2) the “difficulty” of the raters (i.e., some raters are more 
lenient, and others are more severe). 
 
Using Facets 3.71.4 (Linacre, 2014), we estimated Rasch “fair average” scores, specifying 
participants, raters, and items as facets. These scores represent a person’s humor ability after 
adjusting for the difficulty of the items and the severity of the raters, and they are on the same 
rating scale (1 to 5) as the raw scores. Rasch person-reliability estimates were highest for the 
definitions (.68) and jokes (.63) tasks and lower for the cartoon captions task (.45). Rasch 
person-reliability estimates represent the true lower-bound of reliability and are thus lower than 
reliability estimates like Cronbach’s alpha (Eckes, 2011; Linacre, 1997). 
 
Intelligence tasks. Fluid intelligence (Gf) was measured by four tasks. The series completion 
task (13 items, 3 min) from the Cattell Culture Fair tests (Cattell & Cattell, 1961/2008) required 
people to identify the shape that completed a developing series of shapes. A letter sets task (15 
items, 4 min) showed participants five sets of four letters and asked them which set violated a 
rule followed by the others (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976). A number series task 
(15 items, 5 min) required people to discern a pattern in a series of digits and select the number 
that would come next (Thurstone, 1938). Finally, a paper folding task (10 items, 3 min) 
presented a square piece of paper that had been folded and punched with a hole, and participants 
had to indicate what the paper would look like when unfolded (Ekstrom et al., 1976). All of these 
tests have been used in our recent work with similar samples (e.g., Beaty & Silvia, 
2012, 2013; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011; Silvia & Beaty, 2012). 
 
Crystallized intelligence (Gc) was measured with an 18-item Advanced Vocabulary Test and a 
24-item Extended Range Vocabulary Test. People were asked to choose the word that meant the 
same thing, or nearly the same thing, as a target word (Ekstrom et al., 1976). 
 
Finally, broad retrieval ability (Gr) was measured with five fluency tasks: synonyms 
for good and for hot and kinds of animals, occupations, and fruit and vegetables. Participants 
were asked to generate as many words as they could in one minute. Each task was scored for the 
number of responses, excluding invalid responses, repetitions, and variations on roots. 
 
Results 
 
Analysis Plan and Model Specification 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables. All models were 
estimated in Mplus 7.4 with maximum likelihood estimation. All the task variables were 
standardized prior to analysis. Latent Gf, Gc, and Gr variables were formed using their 
respective tasks as indicators. The factor variances were fixed to 1, and the loadings for the two 
Gc indicators were constrained to be equal. Humor ability was modeled as a latent variable with 
the three Rasch fair-average scores (for the captions, jokes, and definitions tasks) as indicators. 
The loading for the captions task was fixed to 1. The standardized effects are presented in 
the r metric and can be interpreted using the conventional small (.10), medium (.30), and large 
(.50) guidelines (Cumming, 2012). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Note. n = 270. Gf = fluid intelligence; Gc = crystallized intelligence; Gr = broad retrieval ability. 
 
Relationships Between Humor Ability and CHC Abilities 
 
How did humor production ability correlate with intelligence? Our first model examined the 
correlations between humor ability and Gf, Gc, and Gr. A confirmatory factor analysis fit well: 
χ2(72 df) = 112.768, p = .0015; CFI = .937; RMSEA = .046 [90% CI: .029, .062]; SRMR = 
.050. Figure 1 depicts the model, and Table 2 displays the factor correlations. 
 
Table 2. Correlations Between Latent Cognitive Abilities and Humor Production Ability 
 
Note. n = 270. Gf = fluid intelligence; Gc = crystallized intelligence; Gr = broad retrieval ability. The coefficients 
are correlations between the latent variables and their 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Consistent with past research, Gc had the highest correlation with humor ability (r = .49 [.29, 
.70], p < .001), and Gf’s effect size was more modest (r = .22 [.04, .39], p = .016). As we 
expected, Gr had a notable relationship with humor production ability, between medium and 
large in size (r = .38 [.22, .54], p < .001). 
 
 
Figure 1. A confirmatory factor analysis of humor production ability and fluid reasoning (Gf), 
vocabulary knowledge (Gc), and broad retrieval ability (Gr). n = 270. Standardized effects are 
displayed. 
 
Humor Ability and General Intelligence 
 
All three cognitive abilities correlated with humor production ability and correlated substantially 
with each other. We thus examined the effect of general intelligence on humor production 
ability. 
 
Higher order g. Our first model estimated g as a higher order model, in which Gf, Gc, and Gr 
served as indicators for g, and g in turn predicted humor production. Figure 2 depicts this model, 
which fit well: χ2(74 df) = 119.916, p = .0006; CFI = .929; RMSEA = .048 [90% CI: .032, .063]; 
SRMR = .055. In this model, g had a large effect on humor ability, β = .51 [.32, .70], p < .001. 
Notably, this effect size resembles the effect of g on humor ability in past studies that used 
higher order models or composite scores (rs between .50 and .67: Greengross & Miller, 
2011; Masten, 1986). 
 
 
Figure 2. A model of the higher order intelligence factor and humor ability. n = 270. 
Standardized effects are displayed. 
 
Bifactor g. Our second approach to g and humor ability used a bifactor model. Unlike the higher 
order model, a bifactor approach can estimate the effect of the global g factor alongside the 
specific effects of Gf, Gc, and Gr. In a bifactor model, the observed indicators (e.g., the various 
CHC tasks) are predicted by both a specific factor (e.g., Gf) and a general factor (e.g., g). The 
specific factors thus represent variance in the tasks not accounted for by the general factor. In 
some cases, one or more of the specific factors gets “absorbed” into the general factor because its 
effects on the indicators are fully accounted for by the general factor. A common example comes 
from intelligence research: fluid intelligence is often absorbed into g in a bifactor model, 
suggesting that (in those samples and models) there isn’t a specific Gf factor distinct from g. 
 
Our first bifactor model specified a higher order g factor and specific Gf, Gc, and Gr factors. 
Signs that a specific factor has been slurped into the higher order one include low or 
nonsignificant factor loadings for the specific factor or improper estimates (e.g., negative 
variances or standardized estimates greater than 1) associated with the specific factor. Gc was 
absorbed into g in our model, yielding the final bifactor solution found in Figure 3. This model 
converged to a proper solution and fit well: χ2(35 df) = 55.098, p = .0166; CFI = .962; RMSEA = 
.046 [90% CI: .020, .068]; SRMR = .043. 
 
How did g and the specific abilities predict humor production ability? We added humor ability as 
an outcome to the bifactor model shown in Figure 3: g, Gf, and Gr were predictors. The model 
converged and fit well: χ2(65 df) = 94.860, p = .0092; CFI = .954; RMSEA = .041 [90% CI: .021, 
.058]; SRMR = .044. Figure 4 displays the coefficients. Consistent with past research 
(Greengross & Miller, 2011; Masten, 1986), general intelligence had a large relationship with 
humor production ability (β = .47 [.29, .66], p < .001). When g’s effect was modeled, Gr 
continued to have a significant specific effect that was between small and medium in size (β = 
.20 [.02, .38], p = .028). Gf, however, did not; its specific effect on humor ability was small and 
not significant (β = −.09 [-.30, .12], p = .398). 
 
 
Figure 3. A bifactor model of intelligence. n = 270. Standardized effects are displayed. For 
clarity, the indicators’ residual variances are omitted from the figure. 
 
 
Figure 4. Effects of the bifactor model of intelligence on humor production ability. n = 270. 
Standardized effects are displayed. For clarity, the indicators in the bifactor model (displayed in 
Figure 3) are omitted from this figure. 
 
The results of the bifactor model thus clarify the roles of the specific factors in humor ability. 
First, g itself had a large effect size (β = .47). Gc was absorbed into g in the bifactor model, 
reflecting the very strong effect of g on the vocabulary tasks in this sample. As a result, there are 
no effects uniquely attributable to crystallized intelligence in the bifactor model. Second, 
when g was modeled, the effect of Gr declined: Gr’s specific effect (β = .20) is smaller than its 
simple correlation with humor ability (r = .38), but it is nevertheless a notable effect size. This 
means that the abilities uniquely captured by Gr (and not attributable to the effect of g) predict 
humor ability on their own. And third, the effect of Gf shrank from a notable simple correlation 
(r = .22) to a small and nonsignificant specific effect (β = −.09). As a result, Gf didn’t uniquely 
predict humor ability once the effects of g on the Gf tasks were taken into account. 
 
Discussion 
 
In the present research, we explored humor production ability from a CHC perspective. The 
findings both support the small literature on humor ability and extend it in new directions. First, 
we found that the pattern of simple correlational relationships replicated past research 
(see Figure 1). As in past research, both fluid intelligence (Gf) and crystallized intelligence (Gc) 
correlated with humor production ability (Howrigan & MacDonald, 2008; Greengross & Miller, 
2011), and Gc had a somewhat larger effect size than Gf (Greengross & Miller, 2011; Kellner & 
Benedek, 2016). Second, the effect size for g—estimated as a second-order factor (see Figure 
2)—was large and essentially the same as in past studies (Greengross & Miller, 2011; Masten, 
1986). It’s important to point out that our study used a much broader set of humor tasks than past 
work did, so the effects of cognitive abilities on humor replicate across different ways of 
measuring humor and intelligence. 
 
Moving beyond past work, the present study examined the effect of broad retrieval ability (Gr), a 
CHC factor that has not yet been examined in humor research. Past work on other domains of 
verbal creativity find large effects of Gr (Beaty & Silvia, 2013; Benedek et al., 2012; Silvia et al., 
2013), and models of verbal humor imply an important role for selective and strategic retrieval 
processes (Attardo, 1994; Goatly, 2012; Raskin, 1985). As expected, Gr had a notable simple 
correlation with humor ability (r = .38) as well as a unique (but smaller) effect in the bifactor 
model (β = .20). These effects highlight the value of exploring cognitive abilities beyond Gf and 
Gc, which are the only CHC factors studied thus far. 
 
Finally, the present study examined the g factor more closely by examining both higher order 
and bifactor models. A higher order model (see Figure 2) found a large effect of g (β = .51), 
consistent with past work. A bifactor model (see Figure 4) found a similarly large effect (β = 
.47). The bifactor model suggested a more complex picture of cognitive abilities and humor 
production ability. Gf had a small, nonsignificant specific effect in the bifactor model. This 
suggests that Gf’s simple correlation with humor ability was almost wholly due to its overlap 
with g. Stated differently, the variance in the four Gf tasks that predicts humor ability is the 
variance due to g, not the variance unique to Gf. Gf consistently has a weaker effect than Gc on 
humor ability in past research (Greengross & Miller, 2011; Kellner & Benedek, 2016), and our 
bifactor analysis suggests that it doesn’t uniquely predict humor above and beyond g. As for Gc, 
no specific Gc factor was identified. The effect of g on the Gc tasks was so large that no unique 
Gc factor emerged, so it was “absorbed” into g. This is surely one reason why the effect of g was 
so large in the bifactor model. 
 
Collectively, the findings illustrate the influential role of intelligence in the ability to come up 
with funny ideas. The CHC factors, taken together, had a substantial effect on humor production, 
suggesting that intelligence and humor are closely linked. Moreover, the effects were not 
restricted solely to crystallized intelligence, an obvious candidate for verbal humor, but were also 
reflected both in the general g factor and in the specific Gr factor. The CHC model thus indicates 
a range of general and specific roles for cognitive abilities in humor, and it offers a fruitful 
framework for organizing the growing literature on cognitive abilities and humor, which has 
been scattered to date (see Galloway, 1994). 
 
The important role of intelligence in humor informs and expands the renewed interest in 
intelligence and creativity (Silvia, 2015). Despite the longstanding view that intelligence and 
creativity represent different strengths (Kim, 2005), recent work has revealed a central role for 
cognitive abilities—particularly abilities related to executive and strategic aspects of thought 
(Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2016)—in verbal creativity (Benedek, Jauk, Sommer, 
Arendasy, & Neubauer, 2014; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011). Most of this research has examined 
divergent thinking tasks (e.g., Benedek et al., 2012; Jauk, Benedek, Dunst, & Neubauer, 
2013; Lee & Therriault, 2013; Silvia et al., 2013); a smaller group of studies has explored 
metaphor production (Beaty & Silvia, 2013; Benedek et al., 2014; Primi, 2014; Silvia & Beaty, 
2012). 
 
A CHC approach to different forms of verbal creativity can highlight what these outcomes share 
and how they might differ. Not many studies have included a broad set of CHC factors, but so far 
it appears that Gc is probably more important than Gf for humor (Greengross & Miller, 
2011; Kellner & Benedek, 2016), Gf might be more important than Gc for divergent thinking 
and metaphor tasks (Beaty & Silvia, 2013), and Gr seems important to all of them (Beaty & 
Silvia, 2013; Silvia et al., 2013). The literature is small so far, but consistently evaluating a large 
set of cognitive abilities in future research would lend insight into the underlying mechanisms 
that these different expressions of verbal creativity do and do not share. 
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